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I  am a senior at UK in the Economics department, after having fulfilled the degree requirements for a Bachelor of Arts in History and Philosophy.  I joined Phi Beta Kappa 
this year.  I am the recipient of the Charles Brent Award in 
History, Departmental Honors in Philosophy, and the Travel-
ing Scholars Award from the Office of International Affairs. 
I have also just been offered the David L.  Boren Scholarship 
through the National Security Education Program, which 
will allow me to study Amharic, History, and International 
Relations at Addis Ababa University in the fall.  I intend to 
pursue graduate studies in International Affairs and work 
in the federal government, working on African affairs. 
Trace Lasley has undertaken an extensive investigation into the economic condi-
tions leading to the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998.  Eritrea, which 
was peacefully transformed from a province of Ethiopia to an independent na-
tion in 1993, wanted to have special trade status with Ethiopia, without trade 
barriers.  In late 1997, Ethiopia erected significant barriers, harming the Eritrean 
economy in the process.  Furthermore, Eritrea introduced its own currency at an 
exchange rate with the Ethiopian Birr that was far from its equilibrium value, 
heightening the economic tensions between the two countries.  Lasley makes a 
persuasive argument that these economic factors were the primary reasons for 
the initiation of hostilities in May, 1998.
This paper is the result, in part, of research conducted in Ethiopia by Lasley 
after he won a travel grant from the University of Kentucky.  In addition, he has 
worked with the U.S. State Department and the Ethiopian Embassy in develop-
ing data sources as well as obtaining background interviews with government 
officials knowledgeable about the conflict.
 
Editor’s Note
The University of Kentucky Office of Public Relations 
provided the following press release:
Trace Lasley, a fifth-year senior at the University of Ken-
tucky majoring in history, philosophy, and economics, 
has been working for a year to be able to attend his 
last year of college in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  The hard 
work paid off.  Lasley, a native of Paducah, KY., has 
been awarded a $19,500 National Security Education 
Program (NSEP) Boren Scholarship to study Amharic 
language at Addis Ababa University.
“Ethiopia has a lot of powerful stereotypes,” Lasley 
said.  “My interest in Ethiopia started in high school 
and I haven’t been able to stop reading and studying 
about the area since. The more I read, the more I see 
a glorious culture.”
Lasley received his scholarship May 31 at an 
awards ceremony in Washington, D.C.  Created in 1991, 
NSEP awards scholarships to American students for 
study of world regions critical to U.S. interests (includ-
ing Africa, Asia, Central & Eastern Europe, Eurasia, 
Latin America & the Caribbean, and the Middle East). 
NSEP was designed to provide American undergradu-
ates with the resources and encouragement they need 
to acquire skills and experiences in areas of the world 
critical to the future security of the U.S., in exchange 
for a commitment to seek work in the federal govern-
ment.
“My goal is to do analytical work focused on East 
Africa for the U.S. government,” Lasley said.  “While in 
Addis Ababa, I will be taking Amharic language classes 
as well as political science and international relations 
classes focused on African politics and Ethiopian his-
tory classes.”  Lasley’s first time traveling outside the 
United States was when he visited Ethiopia in March to 
finalize paperwork. He will be in Ethiopia from October 
2006 to July 2007.
“When I received the scholarship I really felt as 
though all of my career doors opened and my future 
became clear,” Lasley said.  “This is the best thing that 
could have happened for my career — everything is 
coming into focus.”
“We saw not clearly nor understood,  
But, yielding ourselves to the master hand,  
Each in his part, as best he could,  
We played it through as the author planned.”
                                                          -Alan Seeger  
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Abstract
In 1991 hope reigned in Ethiopia.  There was a 
peaceful transition of governments after a long pe-
riod of civil strife.  The main guerrilla movements in 
Ethiopia, the TPLF and the EPLF emerged from the 
war as brothers-in-arms ready to embark on a new 
era of peace and prosperity.  Just seven years later, 
Eritrea invaded Ethiopia and a war ensued that cost 
70,000 lives and did incalculable damage.  This paper 
explores the economic relations between the two 
countries to show their significance in the eruption 
of the Ethiopian-Eritrean War.  
There are three recurring themes in the recent 
economic history of these two nations: protectionism, 
Eritrean status, and the introduction of Eritrea’s new 
currency, the Nakfa.  My work explores the ideas of 
the TPLF and EPLF when they were emerging guerrilla 
movements.  An examination of the economic climate 
of the region sheds light on the policy concerns of 
the governments, culminating with the introduction 
of the Nakfa, which was the point of no return.  It is 
through these concepts that the decade preceding the 
war must be analyzed.  In this paper, I re-examine 
statistics, policies, and documents with the hope of 
revealing a new understanding of the implications 
of economic relations, and maybe providing a better 
avenue through which to pursue peace.
Introduction
Many factors drive nations to war.  There are wars of 
conquest, wars to gain access to resources, and, of 
course, the big one –­ religious wars.  But some wars 
seem to have much more complex causes.  World War 
I escalated due to the significant problem of entangl-
ing alliances.  The different battles of the cold war 
were fought due to ideology and fear.  International 
conflicts always seem to flare up, each with its own 
special causes and concerns.  At times, war seems 
inevitable.  Therefore, when what seemed to be a 
minor border incursion in the Horn of Africa prompted 
two of the world’s poorest countries to engage in open 
combat for two years at the end of the millennium, it 
didn’t seem too surprising.  Especially in this war-torn 
region of the world, some might even have called it 
predictable.  
“Eritrea won independence from Ethiopia in 1993 
after a 30-year struggle but relations between the two 
remained tense and exploded into war in 1998, that 
cost some 70,000 lives.” (Reuters, 2006) 
This excerpt from Reuters Alertnet shows the 
limited extent of the information most news sources 
share about the background of the current conflict. 
None of these sources conveyed the complexities of 
the situation.  For instance, this 30 year struggle for 
independence saw not only the overthrow of the centuries old Solomonic 
dynasty of Haile Sellasie I, in 1974, but also ended only when guerrilla 
groups in Ethiopia allied themselves with the main Eritrean separat-
ist group and jointly toppled the socialist government.  After that, the 
transitional government of Ethiopia peacefully acknowledged Eritrea’s 
independence. 
In May of 1998, war broke out in the Horn of Africa.  The two na-
tions, which seemed to be embarking on a new period of peace, instead 
launched a two-year campaign that saw 70,000 people killed and close to 
a million displaced, and did substantial damage to the region.  My goal 
is to show that the causes of this war, while complex, stem directly from 
the economic relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  I have examined 
the policies of the Ethiopian government and the position of the Eritrean 
side.  Given the dependence Eritrea had on Ethiopia, and the barriers 
Ethiopia erected, economics contributed the most to the cessation of 
negotiation and to the commencement of open hostilities.  It is not my 
objective to assess blame.   
This work relies on a few assumptions.  First I assume that the 
Statistical Data obtained from the World Bank is reasonably accurate. 
However, as is the case with many underdeveloped nations, statistical 
data is sparse.  I try to stick with the big numbers — GDP, imports, and 
exports — to arrive at my conclusions.  Second, as is the case with most 
conflicts, especially modern ones, there are (at least) two sides to every 
story.  Unfortunately in this case, both sides are polar opposites.  I found 
a few sources that seemed more objective than others.  I believe that I 
was able to account for any bias that is present in my sources.  I tried to 
stick to positive statements only, as opposed to normative.  Finally, the 
biggest assumption is not my own.  According to the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
claims commission, Eritrea invaded Ethiopia, in violation of international 
law.  If this is indeed the case, it allows study of what motivated them 
to pursue military action.  (EECC, 2005) 
First, I will examine the policies of the Ethiopian Guerrilla movement 
that emerged from the socialist period as the main group in the new 
coalition government of Ethiopia.  Second, I will explore what status the 
Eritrean government had envisioned for the new nation in the shared 
future of the neighbors.  Finally, I will show how the introduction of 
Eritrea’s new currency, the Nakfa, in 1997 was ill-timed, ill-received, 
and proved to be the “straw that broke the camel’s back,” because it 
was only 6 months after introduction that the war broke out.  I will also 
briefly discuss the other possible causes of the war and why they are not 
as likely to be correct as the economic causes presented here.
Timeline of Key Events
Acronyms
TPLF Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front
EPLF Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
ELF  Eritrean Liberation Front
EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
PFDJ  People’s Front for Democracy and Justice
TGE Transitional Government of Ethiopia
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I.  Protectionism
From the 1980s, protectionism steered Ethiopian 
economic policies, which angered Eritrea.  The 
Tigrayan-dominated Ethiopian government operated 
to ensure past slights would not return.  Before 1889 
and the rise of Amharic rulers, the northernmost 
province of Tigray held high importance.  It was 
marginalized during subsequent rulers.  After the rise 
of socialism in 1975, guerrilla movements in Tigray 
evolved and eventually took control of Ethiopia. 
Upon its ascension, the new government embarked 
on policies that gave special treatment to businesses 
of Tigrayan origin.  With this treatment came 
bureaucratic hurdles for the importation of Eritrean 
goods that directly competed with Tigrayan facilities. 
Tigrayan favoritism specifically angered Eritrea, as 
opposed to the rest of Ethiopia, because Eritrean 
exports accounted for more than half of its GDP.  The 
evolution of Ethiopian trade policy began to directly 
affect Eritrea, as favor toward Tigray grew.
The Horn of Africa is home to four nations: So-
malia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and, as of 1993, Eritrea (See 
Map 1).  Eritrea was once part of Ethiopia.  Before 
World War II, it was a colony of Italy.  Following the 
occupation of Ethiopia by Italy during 1936-1941, the 
territory was under British military administration. 
After the war, a special committee was formed to 
determine what to do with Italy’s former colonies. 
In 1952, after 11 years in political limbo, the United 
Nations determined, after polling the Eritrean people 
that it was to become an autonomous state, federated 
under the Ethiopian crown.  
This solution seemed to make most parties happy. 
The Ethiopians were happy because they retained 
access to the ports on the red sea, Assab and Mas-
sawa.  The Eritreans were happy because they had 
their own government.  This arrangement worked 
for only a short period, however.  Soon Ethiopian 
policies seemed to disregard Eritrea’s autonomy.  The 
Ethiopian official language Amharic was to be taught 
in the schools and the Monarch was exercising too 
much control over Eritrean affairs.  In 1962, the Er-
itrean parliament voted to abolish the federation and it 
became a province of Ethiopia.  Many argued that this 
action was due to political corruption and previously 
marginal separatist movements flooded into the scene. 
One group rose to the top: The Eritrean Peoples Lib-
eration Front (EPLF).  They began small but quickly 
grew in power and popularity.  (Marcus, 1997)
On May 21, 1991, with guerrilla forces surround-
ing the capital and EPLF forces secure in nearly all of 
the major towns and cities in Eritrea, the dictator of 
Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile Mariam fled Addis Ababa. 
In the first week of June, many events occurred in 
the capital.  Meles Zenawi declared himself acting 
head of state, to be followed 5 days later by the es-
tablishment of a provisional government with Tamrat 
Layne as Prime Minister.  The EPLF had agreed to 
postpone the referendum for independence for 2 
years and announced “unrestricted Ethiopian use” 
of the port facilities of Assab. (Henze, 1995, 26)  On 
July 1, a National Conference to form a Transitional 
Government convened.  Among others, the EPLF was 
in attendance.  At Africa Hall, the famous building 
where the Organization of African Unity had been 
founded in 1962 by Haile Selassie, over 20 groups 
were represented by nearly 100 representatives. 
Under the constitution that they adopted, previous 
regime institutions were to be dismantled.  It also 
Map 1: Horn of Africa
Source: United Nations Cartographic Section, 
map no. 4188 Rev.1  
January 2004
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t r a c e  c .  l a s l e yW e  s a W  n o t  c l e a r l y  n o r  u n d e r s t o o d
affirmed “The right of nations, nationalities, and 
peoples to self-determination [and] of independence 
when the concerned nation/nationality and people is 
convinced that the above rights are denied, abridged, 
or abrogated.” (Henze, 1995, 28)
Perhaps ironically (at least for this study) eco-
nomic discussions and the agreement on Eritrea to 
decide its own fate, convened on the same day as 
the National Conference.  “While the people should 
decide about economic issues themselves, no power 
should impose its own economic policy on them by 
putting this in the program as part of the Charter.  The 
[Ethiopian Government’s] proposal that an economic 
directive which governs the economic activity of the 
transitional period be [later] drafted by the Council 
was adopted by an overwhelming vote.” (Henze, 
1995, 29) The position of Finance Minister also was 
not filled.  The pattern of postponement of economic 
issues would continue, as Ethiopian expert Paul 
Henze, traveling extensively in Ethiopia at that time, 
noted, “Ethiopia is in a condition of political efferves-
cence with economic issues taking lower priority.”   
This postponement was believed to be the best 
course of action, so the bureaucratic system of the 
previous government could be discharged.  It was not 
until November, 1991, that the economic policy of the 
newly formed Transitional Government of Ethiopia 
(TGE) was released.  Among other things, it stressed 
privatization and free-market policies.  Optimism 
waned as the reality of governing set in.  Political 
tolerance eroded as did the official strategy of liberal 
economic policies.  This euphoric period would not 
last.  Due to TPLF influence within the Ethiopian Gov-
ernment, the original political theory of the guerrilla 
movement would return.  As rights eroded, it seemed 
that many of the beliefs of the TPLF, during the dark 
days out in the bush, would return.  Soon, the holding 
action on economic decisions collapsed.
The current political reality prevalent in the north-
ernmost province, Tigray, is tied directly to the issues 
of the distant past.  Tigray began its rise in importance 
with the Axumite Empire (ca.  5th century BCE  –­ ca. 
7th century CE).  Christianity was introduced to the 
Horn of Africa through Tigray and King Ezana in 
the 4th century CE.  It rapidly spread in power and 
influence until the rise of Islam (ca. 7th century CE) 
created a communications vacuum in the African 
Christian world.  The Highlands of Ethiopia (in which 
Tigray is located) remained isolated for hundreds of 
years until Yohannes IV became Emperor of Abyssinia 
(Ethiopia) on January 21, 1872.  Yohannes rose to 
power after aiding the British in a mission to defeat the 
Emperor Tewodros, who, after failing to receive Brit-
ish aid in conquest, poisoned some British subjects 
in Ethiopia and imprisoned others.  Yohannes ruled a 
sizeable area, demanding tribute from a large number 
of feudal lords.  His capital was Mekelle.  During his 
reign, he twice defeated a sizeable Egyptian Army, 
returned the ports of Assab and Massawa to Ethiopian 
control, lost them to Italy, and ultimately died in the 
Battle of Matemma on May 10, 1889 against Muslims 
from the East.  (Marcus, 1997) 
After Yohannes’ reign, Tigray fell from promi-
nence and, under the reign of the next emperor, Mene-
lik II, investment in development was intentionally 
diverted.  Menelik located his capital at Addis Ababa, 
in central Ethiopia, far from Mekelle and Tigray.  As 
an ethnic Amhara, his innovations and policy favored 
that region and its people.  Notably he completed the 
Addis Ababa/Djibouti railroad, connecting the new 
capital to the French colony to the East.  Menelik 
is famous for defeating the Italians at the Battle of 
Adwa in 1896, which successfully shielded Ethiopia’s 
independence from European conquest.  However, 
this famous battle scarred the lands of Tigray and 
caused the slow deaths of thousands of the Tigrayan 
people.  Seven years of famine followed the military 
expedition, after the 100,000 man army consumed 
local Tigray village food stores.  (Marcus, 1997)
During the grand and popular reign of Haile Sel-
lassie I (1930-1974), Tigray was further marginalized. 
The year before his coronation, following a famine in 
the region and a refusal by the government for tax re-
lief, peasants revolted.  Called the Woyane Rebellion, 
it was quickly put down, thanks to the single plane 
that comprised the Ethiopian Air Force.  The domestic 
concerns of Ethiopia were largely put on hold in 1935 
as the Italians, based in Eritrea, invaded and occupied 
Ethiopia for six years.  After this time, investment and 
growth was centralized in Addis Ababa and the other 
major ethnic Amharic cities and discouraged in the 
outer provinces.  Meanwhile, “Tigray was drained of 
its human and material resources by heavy taxation 
and recruitment into the army.” (Minority Rights 
Group, 1983, 17)
The TPLF began operations during the fall of 
the monarchy and the rise of the socialist military 
government.  In 1975, the TPLF fought its first battle 
in Dedabit in western Tigray.  They resented the mar-
ginalization imposed by successive Ethiopian regimes 
and, perhaps, seeing an opportunity with the political 
chaos in Addis Ababa, began their revolution.  While 
past revolutions had failed, the popularity of the so-
cialist government (known as the Derg) was so low 
in Tigray and most other areas that the movement 
gained support.  By 1979, guerrillas controlled nearly 
85 percent of the countryside and a few towns and 
cities.  (Young, 1995)
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The TPLF was a guerilla movement that favored 
protectionism based on a strong sense of national-
ism.  Nationalism became a core context in the TPLF 
doctrine.  The “Manifesto of the TPLF” stated “the 
first task of this national struggle will be the estab-
lishment of an Independent democratic republic of 
Tigray.” (Young, 1995, 97) They held the view, popu-
lar among many student unions, that Ethiopia was 
a “prison of nationalities,” and believed that “[self-
determination] means the creation of VOLUNTARILY 
integrated nations and nationalities.  However, if the 
present oppression and exploitation continues or 
intensifies, it means the creation of an independent 
[republic].” (emphasis in the original) (Young, 1995, 
100) Economic nationalism is exercised through pro-
tectionist policies.  Nationalism promotes the benefits 
and sanctity of the nation above outside nations and 
institutions.  Protectionism seeks to impose tariffs or 
other restrictions to retain the sanctity of the nation 
through a healthy domestic market.
The TPLF formed a coalition government in Addis 
Ababa, but it retained most of the control over policy. 
The economic policies of the coalition government, 
the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF), tended to favor the Tigray province, 
and reflected its protectionist past.  Possibly because 
of the TPLF’s senior position in the coalition govern-
ment, official policies of the Ethiopian government are 
seen as giving unfair advantage to the Tigray region. 
An Ethiopian hotel owner operating in Addis Ababa 
expressed the belief that the government, in its control 
of the banking mechanism and general regulatory 
authority, supplies businesses in Tigray with an unfair 
advantage.  A US official supported these allegations 
by stating that the majority of bank loans and land 
leases go to Tigray- and TPLF-owned or affiliated 
companies.  On a national level, the EPRDF policies 
toward Eritrea have centered on competition between 
Eritrea and Tigray.  Trade barriers were erected so 
that the main outlet in Ethiopia for Eritrean goods, 
Tigray, was protected from competition.  As late as 
April of 1998, the President of Eritrea believed that the 
“Ethiopian trade policy was designed to protect the 
market for Ethiopian (and Tigrayan) manufactured 
products” (Negash and Tronvoll, 2000, 44).
II.  Eritrean Status
The issue of Eritrea’s status raised unsettled eco-
nomic problems that heightened tensions between 
the countries.  During the period of 1991–­1997 the 
status of Eritrea remained in question.  Much of the 
debate was fueled by historic links and disconnects 
with Ethiopia.  After Egyptian, Ethiopian, and Italian 
domination, Federation, Province-ship, and, finally, 
independence, deciding how to treat Eritrea would not 
be an easy task.  Tensions grew because of Eritrea’s 
demand that it be given special treatment with regard 
to trade.  This policy conflicted with Ethiopia’s stance 
that Eritrea be treated as any other nation.  Coinciding 
with growing dependence upon Ethiopia’s market, 
the question of status fueled the tensions between 
the two countries.  
The euphoria following the defeat of the Derg 
was short lived.  The EPLF agreed to postpone in-
dependence until a referendum could be held.  The 
TPLF became the ranking members in the Ethiopian 
Transitional government.  They agreed, over some 
opposition, that a referendum would be held in Eritrea 
alone, not the rest of Ethiopia as some influential 
groups had wanted.  The referendum was held on 
the 24th of May, 1993,  and Eritreans voted for their 
independence from Ethiopia.  The new government 
of Eritrea, the Peoples Front for Democracy and 
Justice (PFDJ) was born of the ranking members of 
the EPLF.  Isais Afwerki, leader of the EPLF became 
president.  The problems between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea began almost immediately.  The overarching 
problem was the question of Eritrean status.  Was 
Eritrea to be treated as any other foreign nation, or 
was it something special? For all the care that went 
into making a peaceful transition from province to 
nation, neither government respected the issues that 
inevitably arose.  
The questions concerning the status of Eritrea 
really began in 1941.  At that time, the Italian colo-
nial administration had been replaced by a British 
military mission occupying enemy territory.  Almost 
immediately the question of what to do with Eritrea 
arose.  It was generally agreed that the British should 
administer the territory until after World War II, at 
which time Great Britain, the USA, the USSR, and 
France began deliberation.  While the USA and the 
USSR had geopolitical positioning to think about, 
France favored the colonial status quo, and the British 
wanted support for their east Africa holdings: Sudan 
and British Somaliland.  After sending a UN delegation 
to Eritrea to determine what the people wanted, it was 
found that they were divided between independence 
and union with Ethiopia.  The compromise became 
federation.  Eritrea was to be an autonomous state, 
federated under the Ethiopian Crown.  (Iyob, 1995) 
The federation lasted only 10 years.  Many argue 
that Ethiopian politics could not digest the term fed-
eration.  There had always been a central government, 
with regional lords holding varying degrees of power. 
In 1962, Haile Selassie abolished the federation and 
declared Eritrea a province of the Ethiopian Empire. 
Just before this declaration, the Eritrean separatist 
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movements had begun.  In 1958, a group of Eritrean 
exiles in Egypt launched the Eritrean Liberation 
Movement.  The ELF was a Muslim peasant move-
ment that began successful campaigns against the 
government after dissolution of the federation, and 
popular support both at home and abroad began to 
favor their cause.  At the same time, the EPLF began 
its movement.  Unlike the conservative ELF, the EPLF 
espoused Marxism and quickly grew in popularity 
amongst the peasantry.  After much domestic infight-
ing, the EPLF became the most significant group in 
the movement.  (Pool, 2001) (Iyob, 1995)  
Like the TPLF, the EPLF touted nationalistic 
rhetoric but focused more on independence as op-
posed to economic nationalism.  Indeed, the economic 
status of Eritrea, as envisioned by the EPLF, centered 
on a liberal trade policy but with a peculiar Marxist 
ideology.  The EPLF program was nationalist and 
envisioned independence as the first and foremost 
objective.  “Its strategic goal was always Eritrean 
independence.” (Pool, 2001, 60)
The primary objectives of the EPLF, as published 
in the official program, included: “Establish A 
People’s Democratic State, abolish the Ethiopian 
colonial administrative organs and all anti-national 
and undemocratic laws, and punish severely Eritrean 
lackeys of Ethiopian colonialism who have committed 
crimes against their country and people.” (Cliffe, 1988, 
205) The trade status envisioned by the EPLF was a 
cross between free-trade and proletariat idealism. 
Encouraged no doubt by the historic status of Eritrea 
as a port region, the EPLF hoped to “establish trade 
relations with all countries irrespective of political 
systems.” (Cliffe, 1988, 206)  Contrary to typical 
liberal trade policies, the EPLF also intended to “ban 
exports of essential consumer goods and limit the 
import of luxury items.” (Cliffe, 1988, 205-207).
The economic position adopted by the PFDJ 
rested on their belief in a special status for Eritrea. 
They attempted to operate as an autonomous na-
tion but to have unfettered access to its historically 
primary trading partner, Ethiopia.  The Eritrean gov-
ernment rejected the Ethiopian idea that it should 
be treated as any foreign nation would.  The PFDJ 
believed that because of the nation’s historically in-
tertwined relations with Ethiopia, it should face no 
barriers to trade.  The special status envisioned by 
Eritrea allowed it to trade as any other nation would 
to the rest of the world but, in trade with Ethiopia, it 
could essentially act as a province.  Concerns arose 
in Addis Ababa when goods from Ethiopia were 
being bought, duty-free by Eritrea but sold abroad. 
Essentially Ethiopia was competing with itself, but 
due to Eritrea’s operation of the main port of call for 
Ethiopian exports, Assab, Eritrean businesses were 
receiving unfair advantage.
The trade agreements signed by both countries 
would have justified the Eritrean position.  Among 
other things, the agreements hoped to establish a 
free trade area in which there would be no tariffs 
on goods originating in either of the two countries. 
However, problems arose on implementation.  Most 
people in the EPRDF did not acknowledge that the 
question of Eritrean status would be a problem.  The 
prime minister of the TGE, Tamirat Layne, who later 
lost his position officially on charges of corruption, 
believed otherwise.  He thought the status of Eritrea 
needed to be settled quickly and concretely.  In 1995 
he went to Eritrea with the intent of solidifying the 
trade agreements.  He was relieved of his position 
in 1996, and in 1997 he was arrested on charges of 
corruption that may have been true.  However, it is 
important to note that many believe his arrest was 
politically motivated.  It was his position on Eritrea 
that many felt caused dissension between him and the 
party line, in particular with the new Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi.  (Eritrean Profile) (Personal Conversa-
tion with Ethiopian Scholar)
III.  Introduction of the Nakfa
Eritrea’s issuance of the Nakfa, and Ethiopia’s unfa-
vorable response, prompted the climax of the eco-
nomic disputes.  Eritrea’s Nakfa was released at the 
height of poor economic relations between Ethiopia 
and Eritrea.  After a number of demands regarding 
special status, and allegations over protectionism, 
Eritrea swiftly instituted their new currency.  The 
Nakfa was circulated without any clear agreement 
as to how the currency would trade.  Ethiopia had 
little time to prepare for the sudden introduction of 
the Nakfa and, as a result, erected significant hurdles 
for exchange.  The new barriers that were created in 
response to the Nakfa proved too much for Eritrea 
to bear.  The Nakfa was issued while Eritrea was at 
the height of its dependence on Ethiopia’s market. 
Ethiopia’s response to the Nakfa further frustrated 
Eritreans until they felt no recourse but to settle their 
harbored grievances with force.
The decade preceding the war was a turbulent 
period of economic shifts.  At that time, both coun-
tries were being lead by former guerilla leaders who 
may not have grasped the complexities of governing 
a nation.  The policies of both nations reflected strict 
adherence to party doctrine and neither allowed for 
criticism.  The economic climate that resulted from 
these policies and/or influenced these policies reflects 
this inflexibility.  In addition, when the trade patterns 
are examined, trends that hindered relations between 
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the countries become evident.  
Although both governments agreed on implemen-
tation of a new currency in Eritrea, in 1997 the cur-
rency introduction caused severe disturbances in the 
trade conditions between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  The 
first impasse arose when Ethiopia refused to accept 
the Nakfa on par with the Ethiopian Birr, as Eritrea 
had not only proposed, but intended.  Ethiopia’s 
reason was that the monetary policy of Eritrea did 
not reflect that of Ethiopia.  
Ethiopian monetary policy is such that the 
government retains a certain degree of control over 
exchange and interest rates.  The Ethiopians proposed 
a Letter of Credit System under which transactions 
of more than 2000 birr had to be conducted using a 
hard currency such as the US dollar.  Eritrea feared 
that this would promote smuggling and would hinder 
cross-border trade.  They believed that the Letter of 
Credit system was a protectionist policy designed to 
impede competition in Tigray from Eritrean goods. 
As a result, Eritrea rejected the system and did not 
help in the regulation along the borders.  Ethiopia 
resented this failed cooperation and pressed for dual 
authority on the Letter of Credit’s execution.  (Negash 
and Tronvoll, 2000) (Fessehatzion, 2002)
Eritrea’s introduction of the Nakfa caused new 
fears that may have prompted the war.  As late as April 
of 1998, just one month before the start of the war, 
Eritrea’s president released a statement condemning 
Ethiopia’s trade policy as being protectionist and un-
fair to Eritreans.  He believed that the development of 
Tigray’s industry was conducted to promote market 
substitution that would one day lead to the exclusion 
of Eritrea entirely from the Ethiopian market.
IV.  Other Causes
Ideology
Ideological differences have also been posited as 
another potential cause of the war.  From the begin-
ning, both the TPLF and the EPLF were separatist 
movements.  However, the EPLF cited their unified 
national identity as a cause for separation while the 
TPLF party line was that Ethiopia was a prison of 
Nationalities.  The TPLF felt that the different ethnic 
groups in east Africa were militarily dominated by 
the Amharic monarchy and were only held together 
through force.  It was only with EPLF urging that the 
TPLF would lessen this rhetoric for a more palatable 
unity-in-diversity theory.  After forming the new 
Ethiopian government, the TPLF restructured Ethio-
pia into a federation of 9 ethnic states, any of which 
could separate if the cause was just.  Many feel that 
it was this position that most frightened the Eritrean 
government.  Eritrea is also made up of different ethnic 
groups; unfortunately, close to 60% of Eritreans are 
ethnic Tigrayan.  It was widely believed that if the 
idea of ethnic identity superseded national identity, 
then the Tigrayans of Eritrea would want to separate 
from Eritrea to join the state of Tigray.  (Negash and 
Tronvoll, 2000) 
Although the conclusion is sound, this belief 
ignores certain political realities.  For instance, while 
the situation in the horn is far from stable, it is not 
likely that a citizenry that supported independence for 
over 30 years would suddenly opt for inclusion into an 
Ethiopian state.  At this time, most Eritreans identify 
themselves as such and not by ethnicity.  Also, this po-
sition ignores the dominance the Eritrean government 
has over the press.  Despite the international praise 
of the “progressive” EPLF during the independence 
movement, upon ascension to power, they centralized 
the media and have strictly controlled its diffusion.  It 
is unlikely that the idea of rejoining Ethiopia would 
ever be allowed to spread unhindered by the govern-
ment.  (Cliffe, 1988) 
Border Demarcation
No discussion of the Ethiopian–­Eritrean War would 
be complete without exploration of the primary cause 
described by the newspapers, and that now seems to 
be the major impasse to peace: the border (See Map 
2).  The border dispute arose because the border was 
not properly demarcated in 1993; even during the Ital-
ian colonial period the border was unclear.  There are 
no major landmarks to establish a border; it is mostly 
open territory free of rivers and mountains.  Thus, any 
attempt to demarcate must rely on maps dating back 
to the turn of the 19th century, and to treaties signed 
by monarchs in Italy and Ethiopia, neither of which 
holds power today.  
My position is not to say that the border plays 
no significant role in the conflict.  In fact, without 
demarcation, I believe that no amount of negotiation 
or compromise will ever bring peace.  However, to 
claim that 70,000 soldiers lost their lives and billions of 
dollars were spent to go to war all for the small town 
of Badme, which even the Prime Minister of Ethiopia 
called a “Godforsaken Village,” is misguided at best. 
As late as August of 1997, both sides were agree-
ing to cooperate on border demarcation.  After minor 
clashes in areas surrounding Badme, the two sides 
agreed to set up a commission to investigate the border 
claims and demarcate accordingly.  On May 8, 1998, 
ironically while the newly formed border commission 
was in session, a group of Eritrean soldiers surrounded 
Badme.  Failing resolution, soon more Eritrean troops 
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entered Ethiopian administered territory.  Thus the 
border war started.  (Henze, 2000) (Negash and 
Tronvoll, 2000) 
The escalation of force did not match the diplo-
macy both sides seemed to advocate before (and 
during) May.  It seemed that despite the agreements 
to take it slow and allow proper implementation of 
the border to commence, Eritrea used force and then 
refused to back down, at which point negotiations 
completely ceased.  Ethiopia claimed its sovereignty 
had been violated, and that it would use “any means 
necessary” to rectify the situation and safeguard its 
territorial integrity.  Eritrea essentially viewed this 
declaration as an act of war.  At this point, the rhetoric 
and conspiracy escalated.  
Ethiopia posited that this was another incident in 
a long pattern of behavior of Eritrea having disputes 
with its neighbors; Eritrea had had minor conflicts 
with Sudan, Djibouti, and Yemen.  Eritrea said that 
Ethiopia had occupied their territory as a “fallback” 
position for the TPLF if the ethnic federal experiment 
failed, and they again called for an independent 
Tigray.  The value of resources spent over a mar-
ginal territory does not support the contention that 
the primary cause of the war was border concerns. 
Furthmore, both sides were in agreement until May 
of 1998.  There must have been another motivating 
force.  (Negash and Tronvoll, 2000) 
V.  Economic Causes of the Ethiopian–
Eritrean War
The economic situation, for the period of 1993 to 
early 1998, before the war, was a bit confusing. 
Ethiopia adopted protectionist measures and wanted 
to treat Eritrea as it would any other nation.  Eritrea 
wanted free trade and special status in the Ethiopian 
economy.  
What was the overarching economic climate? 
Both countries experienced modest gains in this 
period.  In Ethiopia the data show a steady growth 
period from 1993 through 1997.  The GDP increased 
from US $4.6 billion to nearly $6 billion (See Figure 
1).  This increase coincides with a significant decrease 
in aid as a percentage of government expenditures, 
which dropped an average of 19.53% after 1993.  Per 
capita income also increased dramatically, rising by 
nearly 24% (See Figure 2).  National saving increased 
to over $506,000 (2006 US dollars) by 1997, which is 
almost 4 times the amount of 1993.  
Eritrea’s economy was also marked by growth, 
but it was much more dramatic.  The GDP increased 
from $487 million to $716 million (2006 US dollars). 
Per capita income rose from $759 (international $) to 
over $1000.  (World Bank Online)
Here is where it gets interesting.  By 1997, 67% of Eritrea’s goods 
were heading to Ethiopia, accounting for over 20% of its GDP.  Most of 
its imports, however, were agricultural products from Ethiopia.  From 
1993-1997, food production in Eritrea decreased.  This decrease coincides 
with a rise in Ethiopia of not only food production but also food price. 
Food exports from Ethiopia, while the data is sparse, indicate a clear rise 
before 1998.  Exports never made up more than 17% of Ethiopia’s total 
GDP.  In Eritrea however, in 1997, exports accounted for a sizeable 30% 
of income (See Figure 3).  Where were these exports going?  To Ethiopia. 
The volume of exports going into the Ethiopian market reached nearly 
70% of all goods and services exported in 1997.  Therefore, access to 
the Ethiopian market accounted for nearly 20% of Eritrea’s GDP.  Thus, 
to the extent that Eritrea’s economy depended on access to Ethiopia, the 
trade policies of the EPRDF were too much for Eritrea to bear.  Therefore, 
only 6 months after the last of a series of trade barriers were erected, 
Eritrea invaded Ethiopia.  (World Bank Online)
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Conclusion
After the fall of the Derg in 1991, the economic deci-
sions of the new government began immediately to 
affect the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 
The impact of these policies on trade volume was 
significant (See Figure 4).  The TPLF-led EPRDF is-
sued policies favoring the Tigray province, due in large 
part to its past marginalization.  The new government 
established manufacturing centers to serve as import 
substitutes.  Also, they erected new trade barriers, 
such as targeted restrictions on certain goods and sup-
porting poor import infrastructure.  These measures 
seemed to target Eritrea, because many of the goods 
being produced in Tigray could and were often being 
provided by Eritrea.  Eritrea grew frustrated at what 
seemed to be discriminatory practices that directly 
hurt its economy.  
Eritrea had envisioned a special status in its eco-
nomic relationship with Ethiopia.  In its past relation-
ship, the status of Eritrea was often in question.  In 
less than a century the region of Eritrea changed from 
colony, to occupied territory, to a state federated with 
Ethiopia, to province, and, finally, to independence. 
In 1993 the newly established independent state of 
Eritrea saw itself occupying a special place in relation 
to Ethiopia because of this shared past.  This was not 
a view shared by the Ethiopian government.  After 
the euphoria of the post revolutionary period faded, 
the new government wanted to treat Eritrea as it did 
any other nation.  Although some measures had been 
in place to facilitate their special status with Eritrea, 
Ethiopia soon negated these agreements.  These ac-
tions ran counter to the primary economic policies of 
Eritrea.  Due to the volume of trade it did with Ethio-
pia, special status would have reduced unnecessary 
costs and thereby boosted the economy of Eritrea. 
Ethiopia’s disregard for this concern furthered the 
decline in relations between the two nations.  
By the time the Nakfa was introduced in Novem-
ber of 1997, the trade agreements between Ethiopia 
and Eritrea had dissolved.  Despite this hostile envi-
ronment, when new disagreements arose regarding 
Eritrea’s new currency, they issued it anyway.  This 
sparked a problem regarding international trade be-
tween the two countries.  Eritrea insisted on policies 
that Ethiopia had, in writing, said they would not 
uphold.  In addition, the protectionist tendencies of 
the EPRDF were intensified during this period.  Fur-
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facilities.  These actions were seen by Eritrea as more 
in a series of trade barriers being erected by Ethiopia. 
Due to the increased reliance on access to Ethiopia, 
these policies further enraged Eritrea to the point that 
it pursued military intervention.   
Due to the dependence the Eritrean economy had 
on unfettered access to Ethiopia, trade barriers would 
have a much greater impact than in other countries. 
The protectionist policies of the EPRDF, based on 
its dominance by the TPLF and the history of the 
Tigray region, had the potential to be devastating to 
the Eritrean economy. Finally, the introduction of the 
Nakfa took place without necessary agreement on 
its implementation.  It was ill-timed by Eritrea and 
ill-received by Ethiopia.  By 1997 the economy of Er-
itrea was so intertwined with Ethiopia’s market that 
hindered access had potentially critical implications. 
Thus, when a further round of trade barriers was 
erected by Ethiopia, Eritrea invaded.  This explana-
tion seems to fit better than ideological differences 
or border disputes as the cause for war.  Whatever 
the cause of war, all sides should want peace.  In this 
case, peace cannot be realized until both sides cease 
the propaganda, recognize their shared concerns, and 
work toward a mutually beneficial future.
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